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Abstract: 
This paper applies ELMOD, an economic-engineering model of the European electricity market to the 
issue of optimal investment placing of generation capacity in Germany under different market 
integration scenarios. The model is formulated as cost minimization approach. We conduct a scenario 
analysis comparing different rules for power plant placing in a national, a market-coupling and an 
integrated EU market approach. We find that there are great benefits for consumers and producers if 
taking into account network conditions and cross border congestion in generation location planning. 
Moreover a change from national planning to an integrated market planner perspective shows even 
more improvements in prices and network utilization. 
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1 Introduction 
Over ten years after the implementation of the European Directive 96/92/EC seeking to restructure the 
electricity market and create competition, Europe has still a long way to go towards an integrated 
single European market. Obstacles to liberalization, lacking investments in cross-border transmission 
capacity, only gradually converging market designs and other issues have made the integration process 
a slow one, and the success is far from being achieved. Nonetheless, there is still some momentum in 
the restructuring process, as evidenced by the European Energy Package of 2009, and attempts to 
incite member states to pursue the route of integration and market reforms. 
The process of liberalization brought up several new fields for research and discussions in electricity 
markets. Particularly the interaction of short-term and long-term aspects is under intense discussion. 
The short-term considerations focus on the efficient management of the existing infrastructure which 
falls under the term efficient congestion management. The literature on congestion management is 
comprehensive. It includes the discussion about zonal or nodal prices (Hogan, 1992, 1999; Ding & 
Fuller, 2005) and modifications thereof as proposed in the European context (e.g. Ehrenmann & 
Smeers, 2005). In contrast to the developments in the USA, where nodal pricing has become integral 
part of a standard market design, Europe still struggles to find the right procedure in order to integrate 
several national electricity markets within a single market. Different regions decided to implement 
different approaches. Ehrenmann and Smeers (2005) provide a useful overview over the debate that is 
still valid. Basically, there are three approaches: market coupling, market splitting, and explicit 
coordinated auctions. Market coupling and market splitting are both a form of zonal pricing. The term 
market coupling describes the process of jointly coordinating geographically separated electricity 
markets. An example for a market coupling is the coordination of the power exchanges of Belgium, 
France, and the Netherlands (Belpex, 2009). In the case of market splitting a single electricity market 
is already in existence which can be split up into several submarkets (normally in case of congestion). 
An example for market splitting is the Nordpool market in Scandinavia (Nordpool, 2009). In zonal and 
nodal pricing markets, the traded commodity is electrical energy. The energy price implicitly reflects 
all associated marginal costs (e.g. production and losses) and capacity rents (e.g. production and 
transmission). In the European context, those types of market designs are also referred to as implicit 
auctions (Meeus, 2006). In contrast to implicit auctions, within an explicit auction, transmission and 
energy bids have to be placed separately. Flow based explicit coordinated auctions are currently 
applied in Central East Europe (CEE). 
There is an ongoing debate about whether the market structures based on the congestion management 
methods described above are efficient in a long-term perspective which relates to the topic of 
investment incentives. Concerning investment issues one can distinguish generation and transmission 
investments. Pokharel and Ponnambalam (1997) develop a straightforward cost minimization model in 
order to analyze the planning for power plant expansion under deterministic and stochastic demand. 
They find that under the assumption of a deterministic demand, the installed capacity would be higher 
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than if stochasticity in demand is taken into account. Ishii and Yan (2004) analyze the generation 
investment behavior in the US electricity industry between 1996 and 2000 focusing on regulatory 
uncertainty. They apply a real options approach and find that under regulatory uncertainty companies 
have incentives to delay investments. Murphy and Smeers (2005) focus on the effects of imperfectly 
competitive markets on generation investment decisions. They find that the complexity of the 
investment decision process increases along with the complexity of the electricity market structure.3 
Smeers (2006) is concerned with the discrete nature of generation location decisions and suggests a 
multi-part tariff in the context of the regional market within Europe. He develops a model that is able 
to calculate economically efficient locational prices which are cost-reflective and allow a separation of 
short- and long-term prices. However, these prices are discriminatory. He concludes that the three 
criteria economic efficiency, cost reflectiveness and non-discrimination cannot be achieved at the 
same time and some trade-off has to be made. Zoettl (2008) models optimal investment decisions of 
strategic firms in a liberalized electricity market. He concludes that under imperfect competition firms 
have strong incentives to invest into capacities with low marginal costs taking into account the effect 
of the generation expansion on the output decision of the competitor. At the same time, the total 
capacities are chosen too low from a welfare point of view. 
However, the aspects generation and transmission influence each other in the electrical power sector. 
Hence, there is some literature on generation investment that includes the transmission aspect of 
electrical networks. Hogan (1992) develops the idea of financial instruments that help to incorporate 
physical network congestion in an economic context. Bushnell and Stoft (1996) state that these 
transmission congestion contracts (TCCs) allow hedging of locational price risks and, thus, support 
generation investments.4 Recent approaches try to define an electricity market design that incorporates 
an efficient congestion management design and sufficient investment incentives (e.g. Joskow, 2008). 
Pérez-Arriaga and Olmos (2006) examine the compatibility of investment signals in transmission and 
generation. They emphasize that agents should face the real network cost incurred by their location 
decision and propose to apply beside the nodal energy price a locational transmission tariff, which 
should serve as long-term signal for network users. They provide criteria to how such a nodal 
transmission tariffs should be determined. Rious et al. (2008) analyze the impact of a two-part tariff in 
order to manage electricity networks efficiently in a short- and in the long-run perspective. They find 
that a joint implementation of nodal pricing and the average participation tariff is the best combination 
to coordinate the generation and transmission investments as efficiently as possible. However, the 
optimal set of generation and transmission investments may not be carried out because of transmission 
lumpiness.5
In this paper we focus on scenarios for generation investment in the German electricity market. We 
analyze where in the current scheme new investment in generation is most likely to take place and 
                                                     
3Murphy and Smeers (2005) do not focus on policy conclusions but provide an in-depth discussion of algorithmic issues 
arising from different market structure assumptions. 
4The terms TCC and financial transmission right (FTR) are interchangeable (Joskow and Tirole, 2005). 
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compare these results to an optimal investment pattern taking into account network capacities. The 
analysis is carried out for different assumptions regarding market representation including a national 
focus on Germany, a market coupling setting, and a fully integrated European market. The results 
indicate that an approach limited to a national viewpoint is insufficient in accounting for impacts from 
neighboring countries and thus results in wrong price signals. We show that an allocation of power 
plants with respect to network restrictions leads to a more efficient utilization of available capacities 
and thus lower market prices.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the model formulations and the 
data used to derive our results. We apply ELMOD, a model of the European electricity market, and 
include an extension algorithm to obtain welfare optimal plant locations. The analysis focuses on 
Germany with an approximation of the surrounding networks. Section 3 presents scenarios and results. 
We apply three different market scenarios and three different extension methods. Section 4 provides 
the conclusions. 
 
2 Model formulations and data 
Our analysis is based on ELMOD, a model of the European electricity market including the physical 
transmission network. The model was developed in order to analyze various issues of market design, 
congestion management, and investment decisions (Leuthold et al., 2008). ELMOD is a bottom-up 
model combining electrical engineering and economics: its objective function is welfare 
maximization, subject to technical constraints. We adjust the basic model formulation in order to allow 
for flexible power plant investment patterns. 
2.1 Basic model formulation 
The basic welfare maximization model formulation is transferred into a total cost (TC) minimizing 
approach taking into account that: 1.) at each node n the sum of demand qnt and the total generation gnst 
of all plants s have to equal the net injection int, 2.) power plants s can not generate more than their 
maximum capacities gmax and not less than their minimum necessary generation limit gmin in case they 
are running (viz. variable on = 1), otherwise they have to turn offline (viz. variable on = 0), and 3.) 
power flows P on a line l have to remain within the power flow limit Pmax. All these constraints have 
to hold in each time period t. 
     (1) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ = ∑
tsn
nstnsPonig
gcTC
ltnstntnst ,,,,,
min
s.t.   energy balance constraint  (2) tniqg ntnt
s
nst ,0∀=−−∑
                                                                                                                                                                      
5Also, Rious et al. (2008) used a two-node network which might not be capable to capture the full impact of physical loop 
flows. 
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  generation constraint  (3) tsngonggon snstnstsnst ,,
maxmin ∀≤≤
 tlPP llt ,
max ∀≤    line flow constraint   (4) 
 
The actual power flow calculation is based on a DC load flow approach as presented in Schweppe et 
al. (1988) and Stigler and Todem (2005). We do not conduct a full (n-1)-contingency calculation when 
obtaining the optimal dispatch. However, a 20% transmission reliability margin is considered. Thus, 
no line within the modeled grid will be stressed with more than 80% of their thermal capacity limit. 
The demand q is fixed and a time-frame of 12 time periods t is considered that is adjusted to resemble 
an average year (see Section 2.3). The model is coded as mixed integer problem (MIP) in GAMS. 
2.2 Modeled approaches for power plant placing 
We compare a set of given projected plant extensions (see Section 3.1) to extensions determined by 
our model. Therefore,  we adjust the basic model formulation to allow for a flexible plant location. We 
assume a benevolent planner approach in which the projected plants are located in order to maximize 
social welfare (i.e. minimize total costs). The generation location becomes an endogenous variable and 
is incorporated into the model formulation. We provide a new set of variables gnew for plant 
extensions. The locational choice is indicated by a binary variable bne which states if a new plant e is 
built at a specific node n. The dispatch of the new plants is defined as gnew and like normal generation 
can be used to satisfy demand:  
  new energy balance constraint  (5) tniqgg ntnt
s e
new
netnst ,0∀=−−+∑ ∑
The new plants are subject to a capacity constraint: 
  extension generation constraint  (6) engbggb enenetene ,
maxmin ∀≤≤
The total number of new plants is restricted according to the number of new plants projected E 
    extension limit   (7) Eb
en
ne ≤∑
,
Thus, if at a specific node n additional generation is needed to satisfy demand (equation 5), capacity 
has to be build up at that node by setting bne to 1 (equation 6), which in turn reduces the number of 
available new generation units to be allocated (equation 7). The objective function (equation 1) is 
adjusted by the generation costs of the new units cnew:  
   (8) ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ += ∑∑
ten
new
net
new
ne
tsn
nstns
new
gbPonig
gcgcTC
new
netneltnstntnst ,,,,,,,,,
min
Thus the new plants will be placed according to the costs objective taking into account network 
independences. Further specifications as which subset of nodes n is eligible for the extension process 
depends on the conducted scenario (see Section 3.1). 
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2.3 Data 
The modeled network is based on the European extra high voltage grid (UCTE, 2004; VGE, 2006) 
with a focus on Germany covering a total of 365 substation and 586 lines (Figure 1). We assume three 
different line types, one for each voltage level (380kV, 220kV, 110kV). The line parameters 
(maximum thermal limit, line resistance and line reactance) are based on Fischer and Kießling (1989). 
As power flows in neighboring countries can influence prices in Germany, a simplified approximation 
of the surrounding European grid is implemented. All cross-border lines between countries are 
modeled according to their length and voltage level and are connected to a single country node 
concentrating all demand and generation of the country with auxiliary country tie-lines of unlimited 
capacity. This approach allows accounting for cross border congestion problems but neglects inner 
country congestion in neighboring countries.  
Generation is divided into eight plant types.6 Wind capacity is addressed separately as an external 
parameter that lowers demand at a specific node. Power plant capacities are based on VGE (2006). 
Each plant s is assigned to one node n. Thus nodes can have more than one plant of the same or 
different type. In total about 300 plants are allocated to 150 nodes in the system. We do not account 
for start-up costs and ramping constraints. Generators are assumed to be price takers bidding their full 
capacities at marginal generation costs. Costs are estimated using fuel type and price, power plant 
efficiency, and emissions. Input prices are assumed to represent average values for 2007 (Bafa, 2008). 
As electricity demand varies during a day and season our approach consists of 12 reference periods t 
that resemble typical load situations during a year. The influencing factors are: season, wind input and 
time of day (Table 1). The periods are divided into a summer and winter term which has an impact on 
the general load level as demand is higher during winter months. The two seasons are furthermore 
divided into a low and high wind input segment. The wind input is defined via historic wind speed 
data for 8 stations in Germany (DWD, 2005). The low wind input segment consists of the 75% lowest 
wind speed hours during the season and the high wind input segment of the remaining 25%. The actual 
wind generation is determined by taking the average wind speed during the segments as proxy. A total 
of about 27 GW is assumed to be installed in 2012 in Germany (Dena, 2005). Load is divided into an 
off-peak (8pm - 8am), a peak (12am, 5pm - 6pm) and a mid load segment. The segments are weighted 
such that they represent an average year based on historic demand (UCTE, 2006) and wind input data 
(DWD, 2005). 
The models differ in the location of newly installed plant capacities. Furthermore, demand and 
generation of neighboring countries is treated differently (see section 3.1). The cost assumptions for 
Germany, the time segments, and the modeled network are constant in all market representation 
scenarios. 
 
                                                     
6The eight types are: nuclear, lignite, coal, oil and gas steam plants, combined cycle gas turbines plants, hydro, pump storage 
and combined heat power plants. 
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 Table 1: Period characteristics 
Period t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
Season Winter Summer 
Wind 
input Low High Low High 
Load Off-peak Mid Peak 
Off-
peak Mid Peak 
Off-
peak Mid Peak 
Off-
peak Mid Peak 
Weight 
[%] 18.75 14.06 4.69 6.25 4.69 1.56 18.75 14.06 4.69 6.25 4.69 1.56 
 
Figure 1: Modeled network 
 
 
3 Scenarios and Results 
3.1 Scenarios 
In total we conduct three different cases of power plant extension: the 2007 benchmark case, the 2012 
projection considered as base case, and the benevolent planner approach for 2012 considered as 
welfare case. Furthermore we apply three different approaches for market representation: a national 
approach in which only Germany is considered without cross border transactions (German scenario); 
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a multi national approach including generation and demand of neighboring countries (Market coupling 
scenario); and an integrated market approach (EU scenario).  
The first scenario represents the existing view that electricity markets are national markets and project 
planning stops at borders. As neighboring countries are not accounted for in that scenario, plant 
extensions can only take place in Germany. The second scenario assumes that project planners know 
that markets interact and plants located in Germany can be utilized to satisfy foreign demand needs. 
However, the national perspective prevails as the actual locational choice is still limited to national 
borders. We therefore restrict the endogenous approach to locate new plants only within Germany. 
The last scenario represents the objective of the European commission to establish a single integrated 
market. It differs from the market coupling scenario only in the allowed locations for new power 
plants, now including neighboring countries. This resembles a multinational planning perspective 
where national borders are no obstacle any more. For the market coupling and EU scenario electricity 
demand and generation from other countries is taken into account, in the German scenario they are 
neglected. The network representation remains the same in all scenarios including the approximated 
representation of the surrounding grid. 
The time-frame for extensions is 2012 whereas only plants that are scheduled to be finished in 2010 to 
2012 are considered within the locational analysis. Plants that are projected before 2010 are 
considered to be fixed with respect to their locations. Furthermore, hydro, pump storage, and lignite 
plants are assumed to be restricted to specific locations due to water or fuel availability. Thus, only 
coal and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) power plants are analyzed in detail.7 Power plant 
extensions in neighboring countries that are included in the data set are not taken into consideration for 
the locational analyses. The scheduled extensions for Germany are based on Knight (2006). A total of 
12 new coal plants and one CCGT plant are projected to be finished till 2012. Furthermore, 7 GW are 
planned to go online before 2010 in Germany and about 15 GW are added in neighboring countries.8 
Table 2 summarizes the projected schedule.  
For the 2007 benchmark case new plants are excluded from the calculation in order to obtain a 
reference price level. For the base case we include the extensions as projected by Knight (2006). These 
plant locations are mainly driven by fuel availability, demand, and availability of grid connections as 
the German electricity wholesale market applies a uniform pricing approach which does not send any 
locational price signals. The majority of the new plants are located in the urban area of the Ruhr and 
the North-West coastline. We assume that this schedule does not represent the welfare optimum as 
interdependences of load, generation, and network are not taken into account.  
For the welfare case we restrict that only one new plant can be built at any given node within 
Germany. Thus, a clustering of power plants at single nodes is not possible. For the EU scenario we 
allow that more than one plant can be build at the approximated neighboring countries nodes but still 
only one plant at each node within Germany. 
                                                     
7There are neither open cycle gas turbines nor oil/gas fired steam plants projected in Germany. 
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Table 2: Projected power plant capacities until 2012 
 Lignite Coal CCGT Other 
Germany before 2010 2.10 GW 0.27 GW 4.54 GW - 
Germany 2010-2012 0.67 GW 10.56 GW 0.80 GW 0.12 GW 
Neighboring Countries 0.66 GW 3.50 GW 8.24 GW 1.29 GW 
 
3.2 Results and Comparison 
First the Germany market scenario is calculated.9 While excluding import and export possibilities, the 
average price level in the 2007 benchmark case ranges from 40 to 60 €/WMh with lower prices in East 
and higher prices in South Germany. On average, the daytime price level is about 5 €/MWh higher. 
However, the geographical price distribution does not change. The eastern grid is still only linked to 
the western at three interconnections resulting in a price separation between East and West Germany if 
locational pricing were applied. A large price gap between Thuringia and Bavaria can be observed 
which is due to network congestion. The corresponding link is planned to be upgraded until 2012 
(Dena, 2005). With the projected network extensions and new power plants until 2012 in the base case 
the average price level in Germany converges towards 40 to 45 €/MWh and is about 10% lower than 
in 2007. The daytime price level is about 2 €/WMh higher than the average price (Table 3) with higher 
prices in South Germany. If plant locations are obtained endogenously in the welfare case the price 
level drops an additional 1 €/MWh for both the average and the daytime prices. Furthermore, the 
market separation between North and South Germany is reduced. 
Comparing the plant locations between the projected and the endogenously chosen sites shows some 
similarities. A fraction of the welfare-maximizing new plants is also placed at the northern coast line 
and close to the demand center “Ruhrgebiet” (Ruhr area) in West Germany. However, more plants are 
allocated near the south-western border to France and Switzerland, and two plants are located in 
northern Bavaria close to the interconnection to East Germany. The latter allows a better utilization of 
the inner German interconnection as they produce counter flows for the large share of base load, hydro 
pump storage, and wind energy transmitted from East Germany towards South Germany. The plants 
close to the French and Switzerland borders are located in a highly populated area with a large share of 
residential and industrial demand. 
If neighboring countries are included into the market representation within the Market coupling 
approach the results differ significantly. In the 2007 benchmark case the average price level is about 
5.5 €/MWh higher and daytime prices are 10 €/MWh higher than in the Germany market scenario. The 
general price increase results from two effects: 1.) a fraction of the German power plant portfolio is 
now utilized to satisfy demand in neighboring countries resulting in higher prices for domestic demand 
in Germany; 2.) increased generation output and demand result in increased power transmission 
resulting in congestion causing larger price divergence. East Germany shows lower prices than West 
                                                                                                                                                                      
8The extension amount is based on Brandstetter (2007), CEZ (2007) Slingerland et al. (2006), House (2004), VSE (2006), 
Elia (2008). 
9A graphical representation of the obtained price levels and plant locations is provided in Annex I. 
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Germany. However, the high price region moves from South Germany to North-West Germany which 
is due to congestion at the border to and within the Benelux. The base case extension for 2012 results 
in a price reduction of about 10 €/MWh on average and more than 15 €/MWh for daytime prices 
compared to the benchmark case (Table 3). Like in the Germany market scenario the prices within 
Germany tend to equalize. However, congestion problems still remain, particularly at the Benelux 
borders. In the welfare extension case an additional price reduction of about 1 €/MWh can be 
obtained.  
The largest price difference between both extension cases can be observed in the region close to the 
Dutch border which is due to the highly concentrated location of new plants. This extension pattern 
with nearly all plants located close to an interconnection towards the Netherlands, and one plant at the 
interconnection to Austria shows that the actual generation is needed to counteract network problems 
and allow a better utilization of scarce transmission capacities. The price pattern in Germany is only 
slightly altered, but prices in the Benelux drop about 3 €/WMh on average. 
In a last calculation the extension pattern of the welfare case is altered and new plants are also allowed 
to be located in neighboring countries. In this EU scenario a significant price reduction compared to 
all other cases can be observed. The price level is about 19 €/MWh lower on average and 26 €/MWh 
lower during peak times compared to the 2007 benchmark case (Table 3). The locational price pattern 
now shows a price convergence not only within Germany but within the whole market region. Price 
differences are largely reduced. The plant locations of this scenario show that the projected extensions 
for Germany are more efficient if placed outside of Germany. With five new plants placed in Belgium 
the major congestion problem of the network is resolved leaving room for other plant locations.  
Contrary to the other scenarios we observe plant extension in Poland and France. The latter is due to 
the fact that the relieved network congestion makes France the most expensive node of the system 
whereas before it always was amongst the cheapest. The extensions in Poland are most likely due to 
the impact of wind energy along the north east region of Germany. Similar to the Benelux border the 
increased wind injection without local demand results in power flows towards demand centers 
crossing national borders. The main difference to the Benelux is the fact that prices in East Germany 
and Poland are set by coal fired units thus no large price divergence is observed along the 
interconnection. The additional coal units in Poland allow a better utilization of the scare transmission 
capacity and thus of wind sources in East Germany. Although, the marginal plants and thus the prices 
do not differ the overall generation costs can be lowered.  
Beside extensions in neighboring countries still five plants are placed within Germany. However, none 
of them close the projected locations. They are all clustered in the north of Bavaria. This location 
allows supplying demand centers in the South and West Germany, and simultaneously a better 
utilization of the interconnection to East Germany with its large share of lignite and wind generation. 
Comparing the price outcomes of those seven cases we can conclude that a separated, national market 
representation of the Germany electricity market is insufficient to cover the interactions between 
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demand and generation in an interlinked European network. The resulting price level is too low as 
congestion outside of Germany is not accounted for.  
3.3 Discussion 
Comparing the overall generation costs of all scenarios and cases it appears that a consideration of 
network constraints is welfare improving (Table 3). This is particularly striking in the EU scenario 
where a saving of about 3 billion Euros per year can be achieved by reallocating the planned plant 
locations. As the modeled plant extensions are solely based on existing projects this gain can be 
achieved without additional costs.  
The consideration of network restrictions (welfare case compared to base case) provides savings in the 
range of 1% or about 200 million Euros per year. However, the resulting price reductions are rather 
low. The different plant locations of the scenarios show that the projected sites within Germany are 
not optimal with respect to welfare maximization. However, the obtainable difference by reallocating 
the plants in Germany is rather low. Thus from a national perspective the projected locations are a 
reasonable outcome. However, if the national perspective is overcome and a fully integrated European 
market could be postulated the projected plants can all be placed more efficiently resulting in a 
significant welfare gain. 
The model bears shortcomings with respect to the possibilities of plant locations as all available 
network nodes are assumed to be suited for new power plants. Furthermore, fuel restrictions for gas 
plants are not considered as the underlying natural gas network is not regarded and coal is considered 
without additional transportation costs for southern network nodes. Thus the calculated results 
represent an upper boundary of welfare gains and price reductions. 
Table 3: Comparison of scenario results 
Market scenario: Germany Market Coupling EU 
Extension case Bench 
mark Base Welfare 
Bench 
mark Base Welfare Welfare 
Average price  
[€/MWh] 
   53.12 43.16 42.46 35.38 
Average daytime price 
[€/MWh] 
   62.60 46.90 45.75 36.50 
Average price in 
Germany [€/MWh] 
48.00 42.28 41.22 53.63 43.28 42.54 35,67 
Average daytime price 
in Germany [€/MWh] 
53.23 44.32 42.99 63.33 47.15 45.88 36,89 
Generation costs [bn €/a] 15.82 15.15 14.97 43.70 40.16 39.93 37.21 
Number of  
new plants in: 
       
Baden-Württemberg  1 6  1 1  
Bavaria  1 2  1 1 5 
Lower Saxony  4 4  4 6  
North Rhine-Westphalia  6 1  6 5  
Rhineland-Palatinate  1   1   
Belgium       5 
France       1 
Poland       2 
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4 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the question of economic efficient placing of generation investments and the 
influence of market integration. Different locations for power plant placing in Germany and its 
surrounding countries are modeled using scenario analysis. The 2007 scenario is calculated without 
any extensions. Building upon this we calculate the outcomes for two more scenarios comparing 
existing investment plans to the placing under an economic efficient regime. In all scenarios, average 
market prices decrease significantly if there is generation investment. When comparing the different 
states of market integration, we find that with an increasing integration average prices fall significantly 
and converge throughout the interconnected network. Furthermore plant locations take place in order 
to utilize the network more efficiently, and to satisfy international demand by locating a part of the 
expected power plants near to foreign demand centers. Hence, cross-border congestion can be relieved 
particularly between the German and Benelux borders. Considering the problems of cross-border 
congestion and lacking market integration within the EU, this paper demonstrates that great benefits 
for consumers and producers can be created when physical network restriction are taken into account 
within a real integrated market. 
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Annex I 
Figure 2: Average prices and plant locations: scenario Germany 
 
 
Figure 3: Average prices and plant locations: scenario Market Coupling  
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Figure 4: Daytime prices and plant locations: scenario Germany 
 
Figure 5: Daytime prices and plant locations: scenario Market Coupling  
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Figure 6: Average and daytime prices and plant locations: scenario EU 
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